Abstract In this paper, we consider a non-cooperative n-person game in the strategic form. As is well known, the game has a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. However, it does not always have a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Wherein, Topkis (1979) , Iimura (2003), and Sato and Kawasaki (2009) provided a sufficient condition for the game to have a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. However, they did not consider necessary conditions. This paper has two aims. The first is to extend the authors' sufficient condition, which is based on monotonicity of the best responses. The second is to show that the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium implies the monotonicity of the best responses or an isolation of the equilibrium.
Introduction
In this paper, we consider the non-cooperative n-person game G = {N, {S i } i∈N , {p i } i∈N }, where • N := {1, . . . , n} is the set of players.
• For any i ∈ N, S i denotes the finite set, with a total order i , of player i's pure strategies.
An element of this set is denoted by s i .
• p i : S := n j=1 S j → R denotes the payoff function of player i. It is well known that we can prove the existence of a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, originally introduced by Nash [5, 6] , applying Kakutani's fixed point theorem [3] to the best response correspondence.
On the other hand, there are a couple of unified results proving the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Iimura [2] provided a discrete fixed point theorem using integrally convex sets [4] , and Brouwer's fixed point theorem [1] . As an application thereof, he defined a class of non-cooperative n-person games that certainly have a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Sato and Kawasaki [8] have provided a discrete fixed point theorem based on the monotonicity of the mapping, and have given a class of non-cooperative n-person games that also certainly have a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Their idea is similar to Topkis's work [10] . He introduced the so-called supermodular games. In the paper, he first got the monotonicity of the greatest and least element of each player's best response, by assuming the increasing differences for each player's payoff function. Next, relying on Tarski's fixed point theorem [9] , he showed the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in supermodular games. However, these results are concerned with only sufficiency for the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Hence, in this paper, we shall consider not only sufficiency but necessity for the existence of it. This paper has two aims. The first is to extend the class of non-cooperative n-person games provided in [8] , which certainly have a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. We introduce"partial monotonicity" in Section 3. The second is to show that the partial monotonicity is necessary for the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in a bimatrix game. This is discussed in Section 4. Here we emphasize that the extension in Section 3 not only is an extension of the result in [8] but has a crucial role in the discussion on necessity of the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in Section 4. In order to achieve our goal, we use a directed graphic representation of set-valued mappings.
Preliminaries
Since S is the product of finite sets S i 's, it is also finite, say, S = {s 1 , . . . , s m }. For any non-empty set-valued mapping F from S to itself, we define a directed graph We now prove the following lemma required later: Lemma 2.1. If D f is connected in the sense of the undirected graph, then f has only one directed cycle.
Proof. We start with an arbitrary s ∈ S. Since S is finite, there exists 0
} is a directed cycle. Next, suppose that there are two distinct directed cycles C 1 and C 2 ; see Figure 2 . Since D f is connected, there exists a path π = {s
Further, since any directed cycle has no outward arc, we obtain s
, which contradicts that C 2 has no outward arc. 
An element s * of S is called a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium if
Therefore, any pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is characterized by a fixed point of the best response correspondence F , that is, s * ∈ F (s * ). In other words, D F has a cycle of length 1. Our sufficient condition is based on monotonicity of a selection f . In order to define monotonicity, we need several kinds of orders.
Let T i be a non-empty subset of S i . For any bijection σ i :
, where i is the total order on S i . We denote by
The symbol s σ t means s ≺ =σ t and s = t. T −i is also equipped with the component-wise order ≺ =σ −i , and the partially ordered set is denoted by T σ −i . Definition 3.1. We say G is a partially monotone game if there exist a selection f of F , non-empty subsets T i ⊂ S i , and bijections σ i from T i into itself (i ∈ N) such that at least one of T i 's has two or more elements, f (T ) ⊂ T , and
for any i ∈ N. Theorem 3.1. Any partially monotone non-cooperative n-person game has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Proof. Since T σ is the product of totally ordered sets, it has a minimum element, say t 0 .
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Then t 0 ≺ =σ t 1 , 0 ≤ |N 1 | ≤ 1, and N is a disjoint union of N 1 and N 2 . Next, take
Then, by partial monotonicity, we have t
Since T is finite, this procedure stops in finite steps, and we get a fixed point, which is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Here we recall the term "monotonicity" introduced by Sato and Kawasaki [8] . Definition 3.2. ([8, Definition 3.1]) We say G is a monotone game if ε i = 1 or −1 is allocated to each i ∈ N, and When G is a monotone game, by taking T i = S i , σ i = id and
we see that G is a partially monotone game.
As a specific example, let us consider the following bimatrix game:
• B = (b ij ) is a payoff matrix of player 2 (P2), that is, p 2 (i, j) = b ij .
• S 1 := {1, . . . , m 1 } is the set of pure strategies of P1, where m 1 ∈ N.
• S 2 := {1, . . . , m 2 } is the set of pure strategies of P2, where m 2 ∈ N.
• For any j ∈ S 2 , F 1 (j) := {i * ∈ S 1 : a i * j = max i∈S 1 a ij } is the set of best responses of P1. However, the bimatrix game defined by A and B is not a monotone game. Next, we remove the third row. Then A and B are transformed into A and B , respectively:
The bimatrix game defined by A and B is now a monotone game for (ε 1 , ε 2 ) = (1, 1), and have a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (2, 3). In the original bimatrix game, the equilibrium is (2, 2). The procedure above is equivalent to taking T 1 := {1, 2} ⊂ S 1 , σ 1 := id, T 2 := S 2 and σ 2 permutation (2, 3) in Definition 3.1. Therefore, the original game is a partially monotone game.
In Figure 3 left, we plot the directed graph D F corresponding to the best responses F of the original bimatrix game. Figure 3 right is the directed graph corresponding to the best responses of the bimatrix game after the above procedure. It is clear that the directed graph has only one cycle of length 1. 
A Necessary Condition for the Existence of a Pure-Strategy Equilibrium
In this section, we consider the bimatrix game, and show that partial monotonicity is a part of necessary for the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Before we show the main theorem in this section, we recall several definitions and propositions requested later from Sato and Ito [7] . 
We are ready to present the main theorem in this section. Theorem 4.1. Assume that a two-person game G has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, say, s * . Then either (i) or (ii) below holds:
(i) The game G is a partially monotone game.
(ii) s * is an isolated Nash equilibrium.
If the number of players is three or more, then Theorem 4.1 fails. Example 4.1. Let P1, P2 and P3 be players; let the player's strategies be i ∈ {1, 2}, j ∈ {1, 2} and k ∈ {1, 2}, respectively; and let each player's best responses be the following:
Then this game is not a partially monotone game. Indeed, there are only four combinations of two bijections on S 1 and S 2 . The above table on P3 corresponds to (σ 1 , σ 2 ) = (id, id). Three tables below correspond to ((1, 2), id), (id, (1, 2)), and ((1, 2), (1, 2)), respectively. In any case, the best response does not satisfy (3.2).
On the other hand, since (f 1 (2, 2), f 2 (2, 2), f 3 (2, 2)) = (2, 2, 2), (i, j, k) = (2, 2, 2) is a purestrategy Nash equilibrium, which is not isolated, see Figure 4 . Figure 4: Point (2, 2, 2) is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, which is not isolated.
